Wow, that's wierd. I was thinking about this exact thing a few weeks ago..... >.> <.<
But no, you wouldn't be the same person. If you completely take apart your body cell for cell then it's like being sucked into a black hole, you would obviously die. Even if (by some miracle) your body COULD be reconstructed perfectly in another area you would still be dead. It would be another person with all your memeorys and characteristics. Kinda like cloning.

I actually though it would work, you still being you. Untill someone brought up consiousness, and i started thinking about it again. If they did it like that, they'd basically just be cloning you and killing the original (you). So you would be dead, and there would just be a copy of you walking around.

So are we all saying its not going to work? Is Zed the sole nay-sayer?

Ash said it was all good too!
Devil's Advocate (and I know the new invistext olololol (and so do you now that you've seen this)):
What's the difference between something identical to you and you? It's the same as you, so it's the same you.

I thought Ash said he agreed with the idea until he started thinking deeper about it. EDIT: Oops I thought you were referring to Ashlander. My bad.

On purely technical terms you'd be right Zed, but I think the entire concept changes when you're dealing with a sentient being. We dont know for a fact that the cognitive sense of 'ME' i.e. the consiousness will be the same one as the original.

Once again, if this technology is used to clone someone, we can't say that the clone IS the original just because he is an exact replica.

Quote from Zed

Hmm. Hadn't read it, but I shall.

@Nish: Why must consciousness be an external thing? I would argue that it is nothing more than the reactions in your brain.

Really? Wow the beginning is nearly identical to what you're saying, they even pose the same question if it's still "you".

Anyway sure it's still you, I could explain but ash did it for me.

@Nish again: I would like to argue that you are not continuous from one instant to the next. What is there to say that you now are the same person you were when you started reading this sentence? Certainly, you possess the same physical characteristics and memories as the other guy (plus the memory of this sentence) but you have changed in many ways too - parts of you have died and various cells have been created. By one interpretation of the Buddhist theory of reincarnation the life energy within us is different from one instant to the next, simply inhabiting the body, taking on the memories and thought processes that are physically going on, and then moving on to the next body. Perhaps the universe is destroyed and rebuilt thousands of times a second as in Terry Pratchett's "Thief of Time". There's no reason to suggest that we without teleporters have any more right to claim that we are the same as we were a minute ago than a man who has just used one.

My only problem with Ash's theory (even though it is quite solid) is that we assume that a sentient being's consiousness is purely dependant on the physical structure. But I guess my argument would move this into metaphysics and that'd be besides the point.

One more thought... most of our cells and atoms are not the same as they were since birth, they change... but that is a gradual process... what happens when all those cells and atoms in our body are suddenly ripped apart in one second to re-form?

EDIT : @Zed: Dont you think we could assume infinite such theories to suit the side that we're taking?

Quote from Nish.Niruthan

My only problem with Ash's theory (even though it is quite solid) is that we assume that a sentient being's consiousness is purely dependant on the physical structure. But I guess my argument would move this into metaphysics and that'd be besides the point.

One more thought... most of our cells and atoms are not the same as they were since birth, they change... but that is a gradual process... what happens when all those cells and atoms in our body are suddenly ripped apart in one second to re-form?

We are asking the question of whether an exact replica of you replacing you is really you, so to make sure that that question is being considered by itself we have to assume that the process of destructing your original body and constructing the new body are both practically perfect. Otherwise we'd be debating two different issues.

TO go further in this debate, we have to define what we mean by "you". When you say "me", are you referring to the physical content of your body, or the sum total of your thoughts? This is an important distinction, because if it is the second one, then we can simply change our label for the copy of you as "another you" much the same way as we could call a copy of a book "another book", or a print of a picture of a lighthouse "another picture of a lighthouse". If its the first one, then you have the problem of "if I systematically take out every piece of your body, copy it perfectly, and re-install it, and only leave your brain there, how much of you is still there". If you say "Well, then that's only MOSTLY you", then you would be saying that a person who lost an eye is not actually the same entire person.

Wow, you really deserve Dr. House as your Avatar.

Ok if we assume that the process of destroying your original body and constructing the new body is practically perfect, it changes some things. My problem with the 'sudden change' as opposed to the 'natural flow over a period of time' would be rendered moot then.

If we go with your suggested second definition... would the 'Other Me' still be 'Me'? An exact replica of a book is still not the same book that we once held in our hands six years ago that cold Christmas night...

But yeah, this is moving into philosophy of whether or not such a definition would be correct... rather than the psuedo-scientific question of whether that teleported being would be the original person who got teleported...

I hope some of my fellow detractors can back me up. :)


EDIT: Corrected some spelling mistakes.

Quote from Ash

We are asking the question of whether an exact replica of you replacing you is really you, so to make sure that that question is being considered by itself we have to assume that the process of destructing your original body and constructing the new body are both practically perfect. Otherwise we'd be debating two different issues.

TO go further in this debate, we have to define what we mean by "you". When you say "me", are you referring to the physical content of your body, or the sum total of your thoughts? This is an important distinction, because if it is the second one, then we can simply change our label for the copy of you as "another you" much the same way as we could call a copy of a book "another book", or a print of a picture of a lighthouse "another picture of a lighthouse". If its the first one, then you have the problem of "if I systematically take out every piece of your body, copy it perfectly, and re-install it, and only leave your brain there, how much of you is still there". If you say "Well, then that's only MOSTLY you", then you would be saying that a person who lost an eye is not actually the same entire person.

Of course it's you,
but,
I'm not sure if your consciousness would be transferred,
everyone would thinnk the replica was you,
the replica would think it's you.
But in the end,
it's not you.
Just a perfect copy.

This reminds me of Heroes when Sylar got all of Nathan's memories put into his head and turned into Nathan.
It still wasn't Nathan though.

If you consider the pre-teleportation "you" to be the original you, then it is gone. Destroyed. So the new you, even if it was considered different from the old you, would take your place and essentially become you.

And it isn't really like your Heroes reference, because the post-teleportation you would have exactly the same body as well as the same memories- if you could consider any two things in this universe to be the same.

Quote from Zed

You're in the future. A guy has just invented a machine that will let you travel across the universe at the speed of light. You step into the chamber wherever you are, your body is scanned, the information is beamed to wherever you want to go and you are recreated atom-for-atom identical at the same time as your original body is disintegrated. Is this machine killing you? Have you really moved?

I would just like to state that I posted almost this exact same topic a long time ago :O

I feel so vindicated :D

Quote from Sumfink

If you consider the pre-teleportation "you" to be the original you, then it is gone. Destroyed. So the new you, even if it was considered different from the old you, would take your place and essentially become you.

And it isn't really like your Heroes reference, because the post-teleportation you would have exactly the same body as well as the same memories- if you could consider any two things in this universe to be the same.

If I'm not correct,
Sylar could manipulate his body thus making it exactly like Nathan's,
Also he had every single exact memory.