While I do kinda agree with some of your conclusions, I think this argument isn't really that good.
Arguments like the verification principle are pretty bad: trying to base the entire world on naught but empirical evidence provides a pretty shallow existence.
What of poetry?
There appears to be no empirical evidence to show that poetry has any meaning beyond a collection of squiggles on paper: however many of us see deep meaning within poetry, and there are poems which speak to us on a fundamental level, even going so far as to change some peoples lives. However there exists no strict empirical evidence to say that the poetry has any meaning whatsoever beyond a collection of sounds ect.
This type of argument is best articulated in relation to the verification principle, however may still work against yours. I'd like to know Zed's view on this as he knows more on philosophy than me, and hence could probably articulate this better, or explain whether I am correct.
The verification principle doesn't really have much to do with dismissing that which is accepted without evidence. If something doesn't pass the principle, then that statement is meaningless, NOT incorrect. When Hitchens says "that which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence", he isn't saying that god goes against the principle. If he were saying that, his statement in itself would be going against it. If he
was saying that, then there wouldn't be any need to dismiss a religious persons beliefs based on their lack of evidence, he would be dismissing both a religious persons and a non-religious persons statements as meaningless.
I'm not arguing against the verification principle here, I'm saying that such principles as the one Hitchens said aren't the same as the verification principle. They don't assess what's meaningful (as the verification principle does), only what's true. There's a difference. Such a principle isn't used to determine meaning in poems, they're used to assess the objective truth of a statement. God can be seen as "meaningful" to people, but it still fails the test that the argument of "dismissing without evidence" lays down for it, and as such it's objectively false but still remains meaningful.
NOW: one of the main problems presented by deism is the fact that the deist god is utterly unverifiable, we cannot seem to provide any proof for it whatsoever: all attempts to do so, without any definition about the nature of God (as is provided by religions describing their specific God) we cannot really come up with any arguments for him.
That is true, but that's not to say that it will be the same case in the future.
This is the problem we've been having a bit, trying to use the cosmological argument in relation to a deist god: it simply cannot be done.
The cosmological is a terribly flawed argument anyway, much more obviously flawed than any other argument that I've seen (even moreso than the ontological argument). The argument from design, however, I feel is much less flawed. If there's one argument that supports the deistic one and is not so easily refuted, it's that there seems to be order in the universe, a universe that's highly improbable. Obviously, this argument is refuted by chance and the fact that if it didn't happen we wouldn't be discussing it, not to mention other options such as multiverse theory. Universal constants, on the other hand, seem like a much more reasonable argument in favour of a deistic god, even if they too can be refuted. My point being, the cosmological argument is one of the weaker arguments in favour of a deistic creator.
The best thing I believe we can say concerning a deist God is that it is simply possible: we can say no more, no less. We rely entirely on the combination of a 50/50 chance of his existence, and upon our own gut instinct.
However the advantages of deism are that by not being constrained by religious texts, God becomes more acceptable in our world: by not sticking to the definition of god as benevolent, we encounter not the problem of evil nor that of the euthyphro dilemma.
It's very much a coin flip when discussing deism in my opinion.
I disagree. I agreed for a short time (maybe a week), until discussing this idea in the other thread that I made. I'll quote myself towards the end of the thread after admitting defeat and agreeing with the opposition (Exilement and all those):
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So I take it the main argument against the 50/50 idea is that before the big bang is unknown, including the nature of the everything and its laws (in fact there really isn't a "before" the big bang because time didn't exist then), and therefore we can't conclude anything about its cause (if there is one)? And at the very least we can say that there could be infinite possibilities as to where this came from, and therefore god is one of many, many options?
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EDIT POST:
I have more in response to Captain Cook.
If anything that is accepted without evidence should be dismissed, shouldn't we dismiss the claim that there is an external world?
We have no evidence of a world beyond our senses, and we accept the belief that there is such a world regardless of this. According to your logic we should dismiss the existence of the external world as "poppycock".
I have a real issue with non-realists, that being the fact that a belief so fundamental to our understanding of the world and the universe cannot exist if what they claim is true. This meaning, if we accept the sort of solipsism that they proclaim, we have no basis to discover anything about the world we inhabit (or do not inhabit), and as such nothing is of any significance. More importantly, whether or not what we all perceive exists or not is of no importance. It's an assumption that we make because it doesn't affect anything in any way no matter how you look at it.
If you accept that nothing exists outside of our minds, then you also have to dismiss other logical arguments and empirical facts that exist within the external world that may or may not exist. I guess what I'm trying to say is, the argument that we can dismiss claims that have no evidence in favour of them is an argument based entirely within the external world and its logic, you can't then remove that statement from that world and apply it to the world it inhabits. If there is no external world, the principle ceases to exist. It's kind of 'reductio ad absurdum', in my opinion, to use an argument to disprove the world it exists in. In the same way, it's a reductive fallacy to apply the statement to itself, which is commonly used as an argument against the verification principle.