Debate Question: Does free will exist?
Definition:
free will
noun
1.
the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
Can there actually be free will if everything we do are just chemical reactions? Are we programmed robots just reacting to everything?
Please structure your central response like this >
[Answer the debate question]
[Anything you want]
[Conclude or tldr]
Come on, man, dictionaries don't resolve philosophical problems. Redefining the term "free will" is an entirely legitimate way of solving the problem.
I don't see how doing things from "chemical reactions" negates free will. I do believe there is free will. I can make a decision and act on it or not.
Say more.
I completely understand where you are coming from. Every thing that will happen has already been decided by all of the particles in the universe having been set in motion, with nothing to interfere.
Say more.
First off, what makes you think that you are an I? What is this "I" you are referring to?
How do you consider yourself a single entity when you're just made up of a bunch of particles indefinitely moving and vibrating in space?
Questions of identity are a lot of fun but have almost nothing to do with the question at hand.
Well we can control what We do and dont do so of course we have free will.
Say more.
I have always held the position that free will and predestination are not mutually exclusive.
Say, for example, I invent an omniscient machine. Now, say it scans your brain and compiles all that information; every atom and it's whereabouts. It still cannot predict what will happen simply because of the uncertainty principle and quantum mechanics, as at some level, events are random. This means we are not predestined.
The uncertainty principle demonstrates that we can never
measure accurately enough to predict someone's actions, but that doesn't mean they aren't pre-ordained. True randomness comes from radioactive decay, and it would be quite an extreme position to hold that our brains are full of previously-unnoticed radioactive material. And even if they were, randomness is not the same as choice.
Conversely, assume a man who is depressed or schizophrenic. This person cannot be said to have true "free will," can he? He is a victim to the manipulation of the outside world. He cannot have fun when he pleases, or cannot look at reality as he pleases. Because of physical imbalance, he does not have the ability to chose whatever option would theoretically be available at any given time. This applies to everyone to some degree, as our brains are all different and are incapable of some form of thought. If we cannot think something, we are restricted. If we are restricted, we do not have complete free will.
I think you can define two different kinds of freedom here. There seems to be a difference between someone having their choices restricted in such a way as they will surely notice (i.e. by putting them in a situation where they have to choose between two alternatives) and someone thinking they have a number of options whilst their choice between them is actually pre-determined.
The answer doesn't strike me as objective, yet. As far as I'm aware it's still a very debatable subject. I think it has less to do with fact, which we still don't have a lot to work with in our day and age, due to our still limited understanding of the universe and life. I think it has more to do with the persons belief. More specifically, I think that people will choose to believe what they want to believe. I believe that this subject encompasses more than a simple yes or no question and involves many aspects of the human psyche.
You know I love you, man. Don't test me by going all relativist. That's
French philosophy, that is.
the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one's own discretion.
I'd say we need to define 'one', and 'fate' to fully understand that definition of free will you've given.
Fate: be destined to happen, turn out, or act in a particular way.
Now say I give you a gun and two people are in a room with you (both are unable to do anything but watch/die) and I tell you the gun has 1 bullet in it. For whatever reason you hate both of these people and want to kill them, and I tell you after you fire your single bullet you will be killed.
It's your choice to shoot one of them over the other, or to decide to shoot neither, or to decide to shoot something else. It's not your choice that I only put a blank in the gun and actually you can't kill anyone with a bullet, but being 'fated' to not be able to kill either person because of me does not take away from your decided choice when you pull that trigger.
However, a different way of looking at that 'fate' in terms of free will is not in your decision you make but in your ability to make that decision. That your decision making process is fated? Right?
So then we need to work out what the 'one' or 'self' is to think about if that can be able to make its own decisions in a non fated way - that it could have chosen differently in the same scenario.
I don't think we'd be able to get a coherent definition of the 'self', but does being able to perfectly predict a decision someone makes detract from their choice when they make the decision in the moment? I guess we could say the person's decision making process was fated, in that we knew what choice they would make before they made it, but I'm not convinced that removes the validity of them choosing for themselves even though hypothetically we predicted them.
I agree with your method but I disagree with your focus on "fate" and "self".
I'd hold the position that free will and pre determinism can in fact be compatible even if said omniscient machine could actually predict the future perfectly in spite of the quantum world, on the basis that being predicted to make a decision does not detract from the meaning of the decision to make it.
I think Skeletonxf is on the right lines. But instead of asking about the meaning of "fate" and "self", the important question is whether or not the meaning of "free will" in the OP is adequate, and what it means for the universe to be predictable. Let's set aside notions of quantum indeterminacy and randomness for a moment. Suppose a sufficiently intelligent mind could predict the future perfectly if it knew the location and velocity of every particle in a given moment. Does this contradict the notion of free will?
The crucial feature of free will, it seems to me, is that we are able to do what we want.
It is possible to restrict free will in the first sense mentioned with TheMasterFez. That is to say, we can restrict a person's options. In this case, they might not be able to do what they want
most, but they will still do what they want most
out of the available options. But this doesn't seem to defeat free will. If you tell someone they have to choose between an apple and an orange, that's not enough to deny them free will. Arguments against free will rely on there being
only one option which a person could possibly take.
To restrict free will in the other sense, however, would be nonsensical. It would require that someone wanted - indeed,
chose - to do one thing, but their body did another
and they didn't even notice.
The determinist position is that we can always predict what someone will choose because that choice is a function of their desires, but
following your desires is sufficient for the existence of free will. Therefore there is no contradiction in someone having free will in a universe where everything is pre-determined.